



# **Proposed Joint Interoperability Tasks for Countermeasures**

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# Purpose

- **Propose two new Joint Interoperability Tasks (JIT)**
- **Propose two new conditions for JITS**
- **Show why these changes are necessary**



# Countermeasure Tasks In The UJTL

- **Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), version 4.0, does not have Joint countermeasure (CM) tasks.**
- **The Center for Countermeasures submitted tasks for countermeasure and counter-countermeasure issues.**
- **The strategic theater (ST) tasks and operational (OP) tasks that were prepared are expected to be included in UJTL, version 4.2.**
- **The Center for Countermeasures was asked to condense the submitted tactical (TA) tasks.**



# Who is the Center?

- **Chartered by the Secretary of Defense to direct, coordinate, support and conduct CM/CCM test and evaluation activities...**
- **Continuous testing and evaluation of CM/CCM for U.S. and foreign systems since 1972**
- **Have developed a suite of CM techniques, methodologies and equipment addressing nearly every form of precision strike weapon and related components.**




# Why do we need CM JITS?

- **Joint Targeting**
  - The ability to successfully engage threat CM protected assets on a Joint targeting list requires the coordination of Joint Service assets and procedures
- **Joint Protection**
  - To successfully protect high valued Joint assets from attack by threat precision weapons requires the coordination of Joint Service assets and procedures.
- **Asymmetric Warfare**
  - If the adversary cannot match you tank for tank, plane for plane, ship for ship, they can use CM to bridge the gap
- **Train The Way You Will Have To Fight**
  - Increase usage of countermeasures seen in Bosnia



# Recent Battlefield CM Usage


- **Operation Allied Force Kosovo Strike**
  - 33 Decoys of various types found
  - Break out of tank engagements show:
    - \* 26 authentic tanks found destroyed
    - \* 67 additional engagements termed “successful”
    - \* 19 multiple engagements of the same target
    - \* 9 confirmed decoy engagements
    - \* 68 unconfirmed strikes



Artillery Decoy



SA-9 Decoy




PROB CAMO-NET COVERED TANK

PROB CAMO-NET COVERED TANK



# Will We See CM on the Battlefield?


- US/NATO reliance on Precision Guided Weapons
- Foreign Sales
- US Sales





# Do We Need CM For Self Protection?

- Foreign/U.S. Sales of Precision Guided Weapons





## Is CM a Joint Issue?

- **CM related challenges will increase as we improve our Joint warfighting capabilities and our adversaries become more adept in asymmetric warfare**
- **In Bosnia it was documented that we attacked 9 tank decoys and attacked 19 tanks multiple times**
- **Each Service feels that CM are significant enough to have Service level tasks. These individual Service tasks need to be brought together in Joint tasks.**



# What Is Proposed

- **Two new JITS**
- **One for Counter- Countermeasures**
- **One for Countermeasures**
- **Two new conditions**
- **One for Counter- Countermeasures**
- **One for Countermeasures**





# **Proposed Counter-Countermeasure JIT**

## **TA X.X Conduct Precision Engagement Counter-Countermeasure Operations**

**Conduct counter-countermeasure operations against threat countermeasures used to degrade/ neutralize our ability to compile a high-value asset target list as well as our ability to attack these high-value targets with precision engagement. On the Joint battlefield, threat countermeasures can affect overall force performance. Counter-countermeasures are necessary to enhance intelligence collection sensor performance and to enable successful precision weapon engagements.**



# Proposed Counter-Countermeasure JIT

## References:

JP 3-0, 3-03, 3-05, 3-05.3, 3-05.5, 3-09, 3-09.1, 3-09.3, 3-18,  
3-51, 3-55, 3-55.1

## Supporting Tasks:

NTA 6.1.3	Conduct Counterdeception
AFT 3.1.1.2.1.2.6	Conduct Counterdeception
ART 5.3.1.9	Conduct Suppression Of Enemy Air Defenses



# Proposed Counter-Countermeasure JIT

## Conditions:

2.6.2	Degree of Camouflage	Low to high
2.6.8	Target Thermal Contrast	Low to high
2.6.10 "new"	Counter-countermeasure Capability	Low to high
2.9.2	Threat Form	Unconventional

## Measures:

>80	Percent	Of countermeasures used to protect threat assets against detection/attack by our sensors and precision-guided weapons that are correctly identified.
>80	Percent	Of threat assets protected by countermeasures successfully detected
>80	Percent	Of targeted threat assets, protected by countermeasures, successfully engaged



# Proposed Countermeasure JIT

## TA X.X Conduct Defensive Countermeasure Operations

To conduct defensive countermeasure operations to deny or limit an enemy's ability to use intelligence collection sensors to detect defended assets and/or attack them with precision engagement. Protection of key assets within the Joint force commander's operational area contributes to the security of the entire Joint force. Defensive countermeasures operations include the use of passive and active countermeasures to degrade/neutralize threat intelligence collection sensors, and threat precision weapon's target acquisition systems from acquiring defended assets. Defensive countermeasures can also be used to degrade/neutralize a threat precision weapon's ability to successfully attack a defended asset.



# Proposed Countermeasure JIT

## References:

JP 2-0, 3-01, 3-10.1, 3-51, 3-58

## Supporting Tasks:

- |                   |  |
|-------------------|--|
| NTA 6.1           | Enhance Survivability                                |
| NTA 6.1.2         | Conduct Perception Management                        |
| AFT 3.1.1.2.1.1.3 | Conduct Military Deception                           |
| AFT 6.2.2         | Educate and Train Forces to Protect the Force        |
| AFT 6.2.3         | Equip Forces to Protect the Force                    |
| ART 5.3.5.5       | Conduct Local Security Operations                    |
| ART 5.3.7.5.3     | Employ Camouflage, Concealment, and Decoy Techniques |



# Proposed Countermeasure JIT

## Conditions:

<b>2.1.1.5</b>	<b>SOFA</b>	<b>Cooperative</b>
<b>2.2.1</b>	<b>Forces Assigned</b>	<b>Weak</b>
<b>2.2.7</b>	<b>Military Force Relationship</b>	<b>Moderate</b>
<b>2.3.1.2</b>	<b>Multinational Integration</b>	<b>Poor</b>
<b>2.4.5</b>	<b>Intel Countermeasure Capability</b>	<b>Moderate</b>
<b>2.8.1</b>	<b>Sustainment Facilities</b>	<b>Limited</b>
<b>2.9.2</b>	<b>Threat Form</b>	<b>Unconventional</b>
<b>3.1.1</b>	<b>Domestic Public Support</b>	<b>Limited</b>
<b>3.1.1.5</b>	<b>Media Relations</b>	<b>Strained</b>
<b>3.3.2</b>	<b>Refugee Impact</b>	<b>Severe</b>
<b>2.6.9 “new”</b>	<b>Countermeasure Capability</b>	<b>Low to high</b>

## Measures:

<b>2.1.1.5</b>	<b>SOFA</b>	<b>Cooperative</b>
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# Proposed New Conditions

- Conditions are needed to support the proposed countermeasure and counter-countermeasure tasks.
- To meet this need, some new conditions will be proposed.
- There is precedence for this as seen in TA 3.3 Conduct Joint Interdiction Operations. Two [new] conditions were specified; one for weather observation and one for weapon selection.



# Proposed New Conditions

- **C X.X.X Countermeasure Capability** – The degree to which threat forces, units, material assets or personnel are protected from precision engagement through the use of countermeasures.
  - Descriptors: High (widespread and effective), Moderate (neither widespread nor highly effective), Low.
- **C X.X.X Counter-Countermeasure Capability** – The degree to which our precision-guided weapons and sensors are able to overcome the threat's use of countermeasures.
  - Descriptors: High, Moderate, Low.



# An Alternative Approach

- **Modify Existing JITS to include CM/CCM**
- **Currently 5 JITS could benefit from incorporation of CM or CCM language.**
- **Advantage – No additional JITS**
- **Disadvantages - Must modify multiple JITS to cover all issues**
- **Disadvantages – New JITS will need to be examined/modified if CM issues are raised.**



## **TA 3.1 Conduct Joint Fires**

- **To conduct Joint time sensitive targeting to attack an enemy with direct or indirect fires using lethal or non-lethal means.**
- **References: add - AFT 3.1.1.2.1.2.6, and NTA 6.1.3**
- **Conditions: add CM & CCM conditions**



## **TA 3.3 Conduct Joint Interdiction Operations**

- **Air, ground, or sea operations conducted to destroy, neutralize, or delay the enemy's military potential before it can be brought to bear effectively against friendly forces at such distances from friendly forces that detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces is not required.**
- **References: add - AFT 2.1.4, AFT 3.1.1.2.1.2.6, and NTA 6.1.3**
- **Conditions: add 2.6.2 "Degree of Camouflage", CM, and CCM conditions**



## **TA 3.6 Conduct Joint Air and Missile Defense Operations**

- To defend defined friendly airspace and protect friendly forces, material, and infrastructure from significant enemy air and/or missile attack... add - **Countermeasures are defensive measures designed to minimize the likelihood of an attack or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an attack by confusing or deceiving the threat.**
- Supporting Tasks: add - **AFT 6.2.1.2, ART 5.3.7.5.3, NTA 6.1.2**
- **Conditions: add – new CM condition**



## **TA 3.8 Coordinate Battlespace Maneuver & Integrate with Firepower**

- **Tactical coordination and integration of land/air/sea units to conduct battlespace maneuver and firepower employment. Battlespace is the environment, factors, and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes the air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; add - countermeasures; counter-countermeasures;...**
- **Conditions: add – new CM condition**



## **TA 3.9 Conduct Tactical Information Operations**

- **Tactical Information Operations (TIO) employed by Joint services to produce tactical information and gain, exploit, defend, or attack information or information systems... Add the word countermeasure into the text**



# Summary

- **Countermeasures are a key component of asymmetric warfare**
- **If we are going to fight as a joint force, we need to be able to handle CM in a consistent manner**
- **Increased sales of precision guided weapons to potential adversaries increases the threat to our forces**
- **Joint use of countermeasures is one way to mitigate these threats.**
- **To accomplish these goals, need to approve the countermeasure and counter-countermeasure JITS**



# Contact Information

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